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You Can Beat the “Market”: Estimating the Return on Investment for National Hockey League 
(NHL) Team Scouting using a Draft Value Pick Chart for the NHL 
Abstract: Scouting is a major part of talent acquisition for any professional sports team.  In the National 
Hockey League (NHL), the ‘market’ for scouting is set by the NHL’s Central Scouting Service which develops 
a ranking of draft eligible players.   In addition to the Central Scouting rankings, NHL teams use their own 
internal scouting to augment their knowledge of eligible players and develop their own rankings.  Using a novel 
statistical approach we show in this paper that the additional information possessed by teams provides better 
rankings than those of Central Scouting.  Using data from the 1998 to 2002 NHL drafts, we estimate that the 
average yearly gain per team from their internal scouting is between $1.8MM and $5.2MM.  These values are 
consistent across the three measures of player productivity that we consider: cumulative Games Played, 
cumulative Time On Ice and cumulative Goals Versus Threshold where we have aggregated these metrics 
across the first seven years post draft.  We used this time frame since teams generally retain rights to their draft 
picks for seven years.  Further, we find that no individual team outperformed the others in terms of draft 
performance.  One byproduct of our analysis is the development of a Draft Value Pick Chart to assess the 
worth of an individual selection.      
 
Introduction and Background 
The Edmonton Oilers selected Jordan Eberle, a center, with the 22nd pick in the 2008 National Hockey League 
(NHL) Entry Draft.  Three picks later, at 25, the Calgary Flames selected another center, Greg Nemisz.  This was not 
the obvious order of things at the time.  Going into the draft, the NHL’s Central Scouting Service (CSS) ranked 
Eberle as the 33rd best North American skater while Nemisz ranked 22nd in that same category; in other words, the 
league’s own amateur scouts ranked Eberle as a second-round pick at best, even if you ignored the dozens of North 
American goaltenders and Europeans available.  Since the draft, Eberle has played 275 NHL games, while Nemisz has 
played in 15.  The Oilers presumably had additional information from their internal scouting staff about why to pick 
Eberle over Nemisz, as well as other centers that were available with the 22nd pick, including Daultan Leveille, who 
has yet to play in the NHL, and Derek Stepan, who has played nearly 300 games and represented the United States at 
the 2014 Olympics.    
Sometimes the information teams possess misleads them.  Infamously, the New York Rangers used the 12th overall 
pick in 2003 to select Hugh Jessiman, a right wing from Dartmouth ranked the 20th-best North American skater by 
CSS.  The Rangers preferred Jessiman to a virtual all-star team’s worth of talent (Dustin Brown, ranked the No. 2 
North American skater by CSS, along with Brent Seabrook, Zach Parise, Ryan Getzlaf, Brent Burns, Ryan Kesler, 
Mike Richards and Corey Perry).  Jessiman has since played two NHL games, and signed a contract for the 2014-15 
season with the Capitals, albeit in Vienna, not Washington.   
CSS was formed by former NHL general manager Jack Button in 1975 as a service to NHL clubs to scout amateur 
prospects and later administer the NHL’s annual combine, which invites the top 100 prospects to come to a 
centralized location for physical examinations, light drills, and interviews with teams.  (Malloy, 2011).  Other leagues 
have had some form of centralized scouting as a cost-saving service to their member clubs, such as the Major League 
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Baseball Scouting Bureau, begun in 1974, but no leagues have placed such a public emphasis on its scouting service’s 
rankings as the NHL, which publishes various CSS lists several times per year to great fanfare.  The CSS employs 
nearly 30 scouts in the field, more than any team’s in-house department, including six European-based scouts via 
Goran Stubb and his Finland-based European Scouting Services.  (Morreale, 2011; Shoalts, 2010).  Each NHL team 
has available to them information about possible draftees from the CSS as well as information compiled by their own 
staffs.  The outcomes of draft decisions like those of Edmonton and Calgary are full of variation—more than half of 
all players selected in the NHL Entry Draft never play a single game in the NHL.  
In this paper, we will look at the quality of rankings by the CSS and draft order by team in order to evaluate and 
quantify the value of the additional information that teams have.  In doing so, we will estimate the average annual 
return that teams get from their internal scouting.  This is analogous to an approach used in evaluating the success of 
portfolio managers in finance—the search for “alpha”, or risk-adjusted returns in excess of those readily available in a 
market index.  (Jensen, 1967).  Were the “index”, in this case the freely available CSS rankings, comparably successful 
at picking talent after adjusting for the cost of teams running their own scouting departments, it would endorse a 
more passive approach to talent evaluation, similar to that of John Bogle when he launched the first index mutual 
fund at Vanguard in 1975.  If nothing else, the CSS can serve teams as “a naïve model against which their in-house 
gunslingers can measure their prowess” as Paul Samuelson (1974) wrote of a market index fund and money managers. 
The data that we analyzed here is from the five NHL Entry Drafts from 1998 to 2002.  For each player selected 
we have their selection number, their position, time on ice (TOI), the games played (GP) in the NHL, the ranking by 
player type by CSS and their career goals versus threshold (GVT).  Teams have the rights to players for at least the 
first seven years after they are drafted.1  Consequently, we will focus our analysis on player performance during this 
period after a player is drafted.  Below we will use the total of each metric for the first seven seasons after they were 
drafted.  Since for all of the players in our sample this includes the 2004-5 lockout season, we will use eight total years 
to capture seven seasons worth of data for each player. These data were compiled from nhl.com, hockey-
reference.com, and eliteprospects.com.   We used the CSS final rankings released prior to the draft.  These rankings 
were obtained via contemporaneous media accounts accessed via Internet searches and the Lexis/Nexis database.  A 
player’s position was recorded as either center (C), defensemen (D), forward (F), goalie (G), left wing (L) or right wing 
(R).  In the analyses that follow we will categorize players as forwards (F) which includes C’s, L’s, and R’s, defensemen 
(D) or goalies (G).  The selection number for a player is the place in the draft order that they were selected.  That is, 
the 10th player selected will have a selection number of 10, the 100th player selected will have a selection number of 
100, etc. 
                                                          
1 NHL free agency is slightly more complicated, but generally speaking players reach free agency at age 27 or after seven NHL 
seasons, whichever comes first.  The age limit was gradually reduced after the 2004-5 lockout from 31 to 27 for the players in our 
sample, but they did have collectively bargained options to have some access to market forces while under their drafting team’s 
control such as salary arbitration and restricted free agency, the latter of which allows for players to sign with another team in 
exchange for that team’s picks in the following NHL draft. 
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CSS ranks players by category, either North American or European, and by whether they are a skater or a goalie.  
Thus, CSS produces four separate rankings without a correspondence between them for comparison purposes.  To 
better utilize the CSS rankings, we employed Iain Fyffe’s “Central Scouting Integratinator” (CESCIN) metric, Fyffe 
(2011).  CESCIN takes the rankings of players by CSS within their given category and multiplies them by a factor 
based upon historical draft selection records.  For players who were drafted but not ranked by CSS, we gave those 
players values of CESCIN that was larger than the values produced by the original CESCIN.  Next, we took the 
values generated by CESCIN and ranked them to produce the CSS orderings we use in the rest of the paper.  Three 
response metrics are considered below: time on ice (TOI), games played (GP) and goals versus threshold (GVT).  
GVT is a metric of player value created by Tom Awad that allocates value in team performance among the individuals 
on a given team, Awad (2009).  The units for GVT are goals so that a GVT of 7.5 credits a player with producing 7.5 
goals over replacement level.  Since players can have negative GVT, we give players who never played in the NHL a 
value of GVT below the lowest value in our database.  Our focus is on the top 210 selections since that is the length, 
over seven rounds, of the six most recent NHL Entry Drafts (2008 to 2013).  Thus, for each year we have 210 
observations except for 20022.   
For the data that we are considering, there were 595 were forwards, 332 as defensemen (D’s), and 122 as goalies 
(G’s).  For GP, 54% of the players selected never played a game in the NHL.  Table 1 has statistical summaries of 
TOI, GP and GVT.  For GVT, there were no values of that metric for players that did not appear in an NHL game.  
Among those who did play at least one game the worst GVT that was calculated was -27.7.  For completeness and 
comparability, we chose to give those who did not appear in an NHL game a GVT of -30.  We selected this value to 
be below the other values in our data and to permit a more complete analysis.  For goalies, we gave them 20 minutes 
of TOI for every game in which they appeared.  Again this was done to facilitate comparison across positions.  We 
considered alternatives to the 20 minutes for goalies as well as weighting minutes for defensemen differently than 
forwards; however, the results presented here were not materially changed by these alternatives.  To gauge team 
preferences for players we will use the selection at which the player was taken.  For assessing how CSS ranked players 
we will use CESCIN values. 
Table 1: Statistical Summaries of First Seven TOI, GP and GVT 
 Median Mean 75th percentile Max Std. Deviation 
TOI 0 1037 684 13880 2053 
GP 0 69 81 553 124 
GVT -30 -12 0.3 114 24 
 
 
                                                          
2 In 2002, the 123rd pick in the draft was invalidated when the Edmonton Oilers selected a player who was ineligible to be 
drafted. 
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There has been a good deal of previous work on evaluation of NHL draft picks.  Much of this work has focused 
on the value of an individual selection.  Johnson (2006), Tango (2007),  Awad (2009),  Gregor (2011), Schuckers 
(2011) and Tulsky (2013) have all looked at methods for evaluating what an individual draft pick is worth in terms of a 
measure of value.  Many of the critiques of team drafting are that for a given selection a player whose future 
performance exceeded the current selection was often available.  See, for example, Tingling (2011).   Given the 
difficulty with projecting the future performance, it is important to focus on the trends rather than individuals.  
Clearly there is monotonicity in average performance of players versus draft selection and clearly there are long tails to 
the distributions of player performance for a given selection. The focus of our analyses is the value that teams get 
from their scouting departments.  It is difficult to quantify the value of CSS since teams have information both from 
CSS and from their own internal scouting departments.  Serge Savard, a Hockey Hall of Fame player who won two 
Stanley Cups as a general manager for the Montreal Canadiens, acknowledged that the CSS rankings heavily 
influenced their own, and the difficulties of comparing talent across multiple leagues, even within Canada: 
We were wrong on the first round maybe 50 percent of the time. That's mainly because of Central Scouting. When Central 
Scouting comes out with their first-round list, all the scouts think, “Oh, Christ, I better get this player in my list or I'll look 
bad.” [All the scouts’] lists are similar because of Central Scouting. I only had one guy, Rick Taylor, who didn't care about 
Central Scouting's list and his list was so different than the others.... How come we missed Luc Robitaille? One of my 
scouts, Rick Taylor, had Luc Robitaille [rated to be drafted] in the first round and nobody else had him in the top five 
rounds. The other scouts down-played Taylor. They said, “You only see Quebec. You don't see Ontario. You don't see the 
West. You don't see college. You don't see Europe.” So scouting is a tough thing to do.  (Farris, 2011). 
We propose that the CSS represents a suitable, if crude, proxy for a benchmark index such as the Standard and 
Poor’s 500.  Teams could, theoretically, get rid of their amateur scouting department and rely on CSS’s rankings, as it 
typically ranks more than the 211 players drafted.3  Below we will look at the difference in how teams rated players 
and how CSS rated players to get an idea about the value added by team scouting staffs.   
The number of scouts employed by teams varies considerably.  For example, prior to the 2013-14 season the New 
York Islanders had 11 individuals with scouting responsibilities while the Toronto Maple Leafs listed 23 on their 
respective webpages.  One small market U.S.-based team estimates that they spend approximately $2 million on their 
annual scouting budget.  This is  consistent with the Phoenix Coyotes’ 2009 income statement disclosed as part of its 
bankruptcy, which included a line item of $1.4 million for “scouting operations”, presumably encompassing both 
amateur and professional scouting, (In re Coyotes Hockey LLC, 2009).  The Phoenix Coyotes’ media guide for the 
following season (2009-10) listed a 10-member scouting department, including management.  Teams have attempted 
heavy cost-cutting measures, such as the Buffalo Sabres’ 2006 overhaul of its well-regarded scouting department to 
heavily emphasize video scouting, (Joyce 2008).  Other teams, both smaller- and larger-budget, have viewed scouting 
budgets as a competitive advantage.  The New Jersey Devils, traditionally a lower-revenue team, have regularly 
                                                          
3
 Though we note that this would be rather inadvisable for strategic reasons, including but not limited to the fact that teams 
would have little idea who other teams’ top prospects were for trade value as the players progressed.   
 6   
employed more than 20 scouts, while Brian Burke increased the large-revenue Maple Leafs’ scouting budget upon 
taking over the team in 2009, attempting to “exploit that advantage” that there are no league-mandated constraints on 
scouting budgets,  (Shoalts 2010).  Similarly, upon his purchase of the Sabres in 2011, new owner Terry Pegula saw 
scouting budgets as a point of competitive advantage for larger-budget teams: “There is no salary cap in the National 
Hockey League on scouting budgets and player-development budgets.”  (Klein and Hackel, 2011). 
In the rest of the paper we begin by considering how often CSS rankings and team draft order were able to 
optimally or nearly optimally selected the best player at a given selection.  We find that teams outperform the CSS 
rankings.  Next we consider a non-parametric LOESS regression following Schuckers (2011) of our performance 
metrics onto the player orderings, both CSS and team.  This approach also finds that, on average, teams outperform 
the CSS.  This work is the basis for a new Draft Value Pick Chart (found in the Appendix) based upon TOI for a 
player’s first seven seasons.  Finally, we consider a novel approach that looks at the relationship in the rank orderings 
and relative value of our performance metrics.  Since this final approach is conditional at the individual level, it is the 
most relevant and informative.  We then calculated the excess value above the CSS rankings that teams get in terms of 
GP and GVT and these are roughly $4 million dollars per year. 
Table 2: Comparison of Performance of CSS and Actual Draft Orderings 
Metric Ordering Percent of  
optimal ordering 
Percent of nearly  
optimal ordering 
TOI CSS 14% 19% 
 Team 20% 32% 
GP CSS 4% 17% 
 Team 11% 30% 
GVT CSS 4% 10% 
 Team 10% 14% 
 
Quality of Central Scouting Draft Order 
In this section we assess the ability of CSS to correctly order the possible draft selection based upon CSS’s own 
ordering of draftees.  To evaluate this we looked at the percent of times that the ordering by CSS as reflected in 
CESCIN resulted in the optimal ordering at a given position, either C, D, F, G, L or R.  Note that this differs from 
the way the CSS ranks players which combines centers, forwards, defensemen, left wings and right wings into skaters.  
We also considered the percent of times that the CSS came within approximately one-half standard deviation of the 
optimal choice at a given position.  We determined if a selection was optimal or nearly optimal by considering all of 
the remaining draftees in a given year at the same position as the selected player.  If the selected player had the highest 
metric among all other available players, then that player was considered the optimal selection.  To be nearly optimal 
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the player had to be within half of a standard deviation (SD) of the highest metric for all other available players. For 
GP, the standard deviation (SD) of the players taken in the first 210 selection was 215 games, while the standard 
deviation of those same players for GVT was 21.  Table 2 has the results of this analysis for TOI, GP and GVT.  
Overall it is clear that team ordering (based upon the actual draft) is better than CSS ordering.  Simply choosing the 
best available player (optimal ordering) happens about 8% of the time, on average, using CSS and about 14% of the 
time with team ordering.  Ordering players so that the current selection is nearly optimal happens about an average of 
14% of the time for Central Scouting.  For teams this latter value is about 26%.  A further analysis of these data 
indicates that the advantage for team ordering is persistent across rounds.  These results can be found in Table 3. 
 
Comparison of Average Performance by Player Ordering 
Above, we have concentrated on the optimal or nearly optimal decision at a given selection.  We next looked at the 
impact of these selection criteria on the average outcome variables per draft selection.  To evaluate this impact we 
looked at the relationship between our response metrics (TOI, GP and GVT)  and player ordering.  Figure 2 has plots 
of these relationships.  As before, ordering for CSS is done based upon CESCIN while ordering for teams is from the 
actual draft selections.  To estimate these relationships we use LOESS regression as was done in Schuckers (2011) for 
National Football League data.  LOESS regression is a flexible non-parametric methodology for locally smoothing the 
response at each value of the predictor (selection).   
Table 3:  Comparison of Drafting Performance by Ordering and by Round 
GP      
Ordering by  Team   CSS  
Rounds Optimal Near Optimal  Optimal Near Optimal 
1 to 3 6% 15%  2% 5% 
4 to 7 12% 30%  9% 27% 
 
GVT      
Ordering by  Team   CSS  
Rounds Optimal Near Optimal  Optimal Near Optimal 
1 to 3 6% 10%  3% 4% 
4 to 7 12% 18%  10% 12% 
 
TOI      
Ordering by Team   CSS  
Rounds Optimal Near Optimal  Optimal Near Optimal 
1 to 3 16% 21%  11% 14% 
4 to 7 21% 39%  18% 37% 
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In the leftmost graph of Figure 2 we have plots of the LOESS regressions for predicting TOI based upon the draft 
selection order from CSS (blue) and from the actual draft (red). Our expected or predicted values from both of these 
curves are very similar.  Both start at roughly the same value for the first selections and decrease steeply until 
approximately the 40th selection, then less steeply until the 120th selection after which they are roughly flat. The 
difference between the two curves is that the draft selections outperform the CSS rankings from about 40 to 100.  
Currently this corresponds to roughly the early second round to the end of the third round.  These are the locations 
where, on average, team selections are better than the ordering from Central Scouting.  Central Scouting does better 
than teams over the last 35 selections.  Moving to GP and GVT, we see a similar shape to the smoothed prediction 
relationship that we found for TOI.  Although somewhat hard to judge due to the different scaling of the y-axes, the 
overall shape of these curves is quite similar. 
     
Rank Differential Comparison 
While the above analysis gives a sense of how CSS and team scouting group perform in their rankings on average, 
those comparisons and rankings do not condition on some important factors such as the individual player and their 
position.  To account for these we next consider an analysis that looks at the differential between each player’s actual 
selection and their CSS ranking.  Below we will refer to this as rank differential ( rank).  For example, Rico Fata was 
the 6th overall selection by the Calgary Flames in the 1998 draft.  CESCIN has Fata as the 13th ranked player.  
Consequently our rank differential for Fata would be -7 meaning he was taken seven places ahead of where CSS 
ranked him.  Players with negative rank differential were taken earlier than CSS ranked them and players with positive 
rank differential were taken later than CSS ranked them.  56% of selections were rank differential positive, 43% were 
negative and 1% were zero.  If team scouting does well then we should expect that players who have negative rank 
differential will also outperform what we would expect based upon CSS ranking of them and thus have positive metric 
Figure 1: Average Performance Comparison for CSS and Team Draft Ordering: (l to r) TOI, GP, GVT 
TOI GP GVT 
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differential ( metric), and vice versa for players with positive rank differential.  In general, our approach for the ith 
draft player can be stated as:     
 metrici = fmetric ( ranki) 
where fmetric is a function to be estimated separately for TOI, GP and GVT. 
For TOI, GP and GVT we looked at what each player achieved relative to what we would have expected from 
them based upon their CSS ranking and compared that to what we would have expected based upon their actual draft 
selection.  To calculate the expected values we used the LOESS regressions from Figure 1.  Figure 2 has a plot of each 
player’s first seven season’s total TOI minus the Expected TOI for each player plotted against their rank differential 
as well as the same plot for TOI, GP and GVT.   If team scouting was perfect, there would only be players in the 
upper left and lower right quadrants of these graphs.  Players in the upper left are those that exceeded CSS 
expectations and were taken earlier than CSS had them ranked.  Players in the lower left are those that 
underperformed CSS expectations and teams drafted them earlier than CSS had them ranked.  Each graph in Figure 2 
also contains a green curve that is the estimated smoothed fmetric.  It is important to note that all of these curves are 
negatively sloped and roughly pass through the origin (0,0).  This suggests that when teams differentiate from the CSS 
ordering they are, on average, gaining some value in terms of TOI, GP or GVT.  To estimate the average net values 
that team scouting contributes above and beyond the CSS, we estimated the TOI, GP and GVT gained at each rank 
differential for all players.  That is, we calculated: 
i𝑓𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 ( ranki)1( ranki >0) -i 𝑓𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 ( ranki)1( ranki <0)]/[Total number of selections] 
which represents the estimated average gained on each metric per draft pick.  We then scaled the average values of 
each to seven selections per season which is the average number of picks that a team has in the current NHL Entry 
Draft.  This quantity then represents per team per draft gain from the information generated by internal scouting.  We 
then used the following information to estimate the average annual revenue differential due to team scouting.  Using 
20 minutes per game as an average, we estimated that team gained approximately $1.7MM in value from their internal 
Figure 2: Relationship between Relative Performance and Rank Differential: (l to r) TOI, GP, GVT  
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scouting.  Since the average NHL salary per game is approximately $29,300 (Dorish, 2011), we can say that in terms of 
GP team scouting adds approximately $2.5MM with each draft.  Using GVT, we estimate that team scouting gains a 
team about $5.3MM in value using the metric that a goal in the NHL is worth approximately $1/3MM (Vollman, 
2012).  A further analysis by position (including the estimation of fmetric by position) yielded similar relationships and 
results for each of these three metrics. 
We also analyzed the value gained over these drafts by team.  There are some winners and losers but the average 
gains per team per draft pick across these five years did not differ significantly from what would have been expected 
by chance (Shapiro-Wilk p-values: p>0.1 for all).  We used an average here since Atlanta, Columbus and Minnesota 
entered the league between 1999 and 2000 and participated in fewer drafts and, hence, had fewer draft seletions than 
the other teams. No teams were outlier in this analysis.  Further, we looked at the correlation in team average return 
over CSS for 1998-2000 and the team average return over CSS for 2001-2002.  The correlations were slightly positive, 
r ~0.2 for all three metrics, but not significantly so (p>0.1 for all).  No team over this period outperformed the others 
and no team got a significantly larger or smaller average return from their internal scouting.  We further have no way 
to estimate each team’s scouting budget, emphasis on particular leagues or countries, or draft strategies based on 
positional need or best available talent. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have looked at the impact of team scouting compared to the NHL’s CSS.   The metrics for 
performance that we have used are TOI, GP and GVT for the first seven seasons of a player’s career.  We began by 
looking at the chance that the ordering by CSS and by team scouting resulted in choosing optimal or nearly optimal 
players.  At a given selection, teams were not significantly better at picking optimal players with respect to TOI, GP, 
or GVT but were markedly better at selecting players within a half standard deviation of optimal.  There is a clear 
Figure 3: Plot of (Unscaled) Draft Value Pick Chart on Graph 
of First Seven Years TOI v. Selection 
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benefit here to the additional information that team’s possess relative to the NHL CSS. To quantify the value of this 
information we presented a novel methodology that looks at the expected differential from the two rankings relative 
to the difference in the rankings themselves.  This new and comprehensive approach can be applied to any sport and 
any method for ordering draft selections and evaluating the performance of players. It is clear from this analysis that 
individual NHL team rankings consistently outperform CSS rankings.  This should be expected since teams use 
considerable resources to gain further information about each potential draftee.   The models here form the basis for 
a new NHL Draft Value Pick Chart (Table 4 and Figure 3) based upon the NHL TOI for a given selection in their 
first seven post-draft seasons.  We prefer TOI as it is the most direct of these measures for assessing the value that 
teams give to their draft choices. For TOI, GP and GVT, we find that the average value that a team gets from their 
scouting is between $1.8MM and $5.2MM per year. This range represents the average return that teams get on the 
total amount that they spend on scouting. It also represents a set of bounds on the amounts teams should budget for 
internal scouting.  Further there was variability between teams in their average return from drafting; however, that 
variability was not beyond what would have been expected by chance.  This means that there is not strong enough 
evidence to suggest that drafting quality is different across teams, at least for the five years that we considered.  A 
larger sample over a longer period of time could provide additional evidence of differences amongst teams.   
This analysis could be improved by having better metrics for career player performance.  The three that we have 
used here, TOI, GVT and GP, are reasonable proxies.  As hockey analytics develop, utilizing more advanced methods 
like the Expected Goals Model (EGM), Macdonald (2012) or the Total Hockey Ratings (THoR) (Schuckers and 
Curro, 2013) will provide better estimates for player value and the value of player scouting once they are available for 
historical data.  In this analysis we focused on five years of NHL Draft Entry selections.  Additional years of draft 
data would provide better estimates of player value and of the value of team scouting.  We also note that while team 
scouting outperforms the Central Scouting Service, team scouting is far from optimal.  A future analysis might look at 
the predictive power of analytics such as league equivalencies, see for example Desjardins (2004) or Vollman (2011), 
to rank players and compare results from that sort of analysis to those given here.  Similarly, better data on teams’ 
front office personnel and duties would provide proxies for team budgets and geographic areas of emphasis.  With all 
that in mind, however, it is clear from this analysis that NHL teams are getting considerable financial benefit from 
their internal scouting.  They are beating the market set by the Central Scouting Service.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 4: NHL DRAFT VALUE PICK CHART 
 
Selection Value  Selection Value  Selection  Value  Selection Value  Selection Value  Selection Value  Selection Value 
1 1000  31 221  61 150  91 98  121 63  151 58  181 42 
2 932  32 210  62 148  92 96  122 63  152 57  182 42 
3 862  33 200  63 144  93 95  123 63  153 57  183 41 
4 801  34 191  64 140  94 94  124 63  154 57  184 41 
5 743  35 186  65 135  95 93  125 62  155 56  185 40 
6 691  36 180  66 128  96 92  126 62  156 56  186 39 
7 645  37 176  67 127  97 92  127 62  157 56  187 38 
8 606  38 172  68 126  98 91  128 62  158 56  188 38 
9 567  39 171  69 126  99 91  129 62  159 55  189 37 
10 546  40 171  70 125  100 91  130 62  160 55  190 36 
11 523  41 170  71 124  101 89  131 62  161 54  191 35 
12 502  42 169  72 123  102 81  132 62  162 54  192 35 
13 482  43 168  73 122  103 73  133 62  163 54  193 34 
14 462  44 168  74 121  104 67  134 62  164 53  194 34 
15 446  45 167  75 119  105 67  135 62  165 53  195 34 
16 431  46 166  76 118  106 66  136 61  166 53  196 33 
17 420  47 165  77 117  107 66  137 61  167 53  197 33 
18 410  48 165  78 116  108 65  138 61  168 52  198 33 
19 401  49 164  79 115  109 65  139 61  169 51  199 32 
20 391  50 163  80 113  110 65  140 61  170 50  200 32 
21 381  51 162  81 111  111 65  141 61  171 49  201 31 
22 371  52 162  82 110  112 65  142 61  172 48  202 31 
23 357  53 161  83 109  113 65  143 61  173 47  203 30 
24 341  54 159  84 107  114 65  144 60  174 46  204 30 
25 325  55 155  85 107  115 65  145 60  175 45  205 30 
26 311  56 152  86 105  116 65  146 60  176 45  206 29 
27 296  57 151  87 104  117 65  147 59  177 44  207 28 
28 276  58 151  88 103  118 64  148 59  178 44  208 27 
29 257  59 150  89 101  119 64  149 58  179 43  209 26 
30 238  60 150  90 100  120 64  150 58  180 43  210 25 
 
Note that we used a monotonic regression of TOI onto Selection for this chart following the monreg package in R. 
